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There is a long-standing debate over price vs. quantity approaches to supporting the deployment of
renewable electricity technologies. In the context of a recent shift from quantity to price-based support,
the UK has also introduced a new form of budgetary framework, the Levy Control Framework (LCF). The
introduction of the LCF has been very important for investors but has received relatively little attention in
the academic literature. The paper gives an overview of the LCF, explores its effects on renewables policy,
on consumers and on investor conﬁdence arguing that an unintended consequence of its introduction
has been to increase uncertainty, through interactions with underlying support mechanisms. A number
of problems with the current scope and design of the LCF are noted. It is argued that the LCF is best
understood as aimed at avoiding a political backlash against renewable support policy in a context where
the beneﬁts of such policy are concentrated economically and socially. The paper concludes by placing
the LCF within a wider context of a shift towards greater budgetary control over renewable energy
support policy across European countries.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Over the last decade, Europe has been making progress on the
expansion of renewable energy, while also bringing down green-
house gas emissions (EEA, 2015). The fastest expansion has come
in the electricity sector, with electricity from renewable sources in
EU countries increasing from 14.8% in 2005 to an estimated 27.1%
in 2014 (ibid: 43) and 29% in 2015 (Sandbag, 2016). The expansion
of renewable energy has been arguably the most successful ele-
ment in Europe's climate policy, since carbon pricing through the
Emissions Trading Scheme has not had a major effect on fuel
switching or investment decisions to date (Grubb et al., 2012).r Ltd. This is an open access articleHowever, at the level of individual countries, the expansion of
renewable energy has not been entirely smooth. Belgium, Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy and Spain have recently made
retrospective changes (i.e. that affect future returns on existing
investments) or retroactive changes (i.e. that affect future and past
returns on existing investments) to renewable support policies, or
introduced moratoria on new investments, all of which have had
signiﬁcant negative effects on investment (Keep on Track; Del Río
and Mir-Artigues 2012, 2014; Behn and Fauchald 2015; Fouquet
and Nysten, 2015; Gatzert and Kosub, 2016). 1
Until recently, the government in the UK has largely avoidedunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 See Fouquet and Nysten (2015) for full deﬁnitions of retrospective and ret-
roactive measures.
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renewable energy. However, in 2015, a number of changes were
made, including a large and sudden reduction in support for solar
PV and the bringing forward of removal of some technologies from
support schemes, that have had a signiﬁcant impact on investor
conﬁdence (HoC ECCC, 2016a, 2016b). One result has been that in
2015 the UK slipped outside the top 10 on the Ernst and Young
Renewables Attractiveness Index for the ﬁrst time since its in-
ception. These events were driven in the ﬁrst instance by a fra-
mework for renewable energy policy costs that was introduced in
2011, called the Levy Control Framework (LCF), which sets a cap on
the total amount of support. In response to an anticipated
breaching of the LCF, the government has attempted to use dif-
ferent policy levers, i.e. points of intervention varying across the
different programmes covered by the Framework, to contain ex-
pected future costs.
The LCF is a signiﬁcant development because it imposes a
budgetary-based mechanism on top of existing quantity and price-
based support schemes. It has the potential effect of subordinating
renewable energy policy to budgetary policy, which could have
implications for long term policy credibility. The LCF should be
seen within the context of renewable investment ‘bubbles’ fol-
lowed by damaging policy reversals in some other countries, as
mentioned above, and can be seen as an attempt to avoid such
problems. However, while the intention may have been to reduce
policy risk, one of the immediate effects of the LCF has been to
increase uncertainty for potential investors in renewables. A major
reason for this is that the LCF interacts with a number of varying
factors, including the wholesale power price and small scale re-
newable technology growth, the government's assumptions about
which have not been made clear.
While the introduction of the LCF has had a major impact in the
investor community – described by the Chair of the Institutional
Investors Group on Climate Change as ‘hugely’ inﬂuential in in-
vestment decisions (HoC ECCC 2016a: 23) – it has so far attracted
little notice in the academic literature. This paper aims to address
this gap, and argues that the LCF has quite profound implications
for renewable energy policy in the UK looking ahead. The paper
also seeks to clarify the purpose of the LCF, and in particular
whether it is primarily aimed at protecting consumers or at shor-
ing up investor conﬁdence, arguing that the latter is the most
plausible. An evaluation of the LCF's design and record to date in
meeting these aims is given.
The next section brieﬂy lays out the wider context of the policy
and political challenges of setting levels of renewable support, and
challenges that have arisen in other countries. Section 3 then gives
a brief description of the history of UK renewable energy support
policy and the introduction and evolution of the LCF up to 2015. In
Section 4, the effects and signiﬁcance of the LCF for renewable
energy policy in the UK are examined. Section 5 assesses various
potential interpretations of the LCF, including purely political ob-
jectives. It also makes an assessment of the design and record of
the LCF from the point of view of protecting consumer welfare and
underpinning investor conﬁdence. The paper concludes with some
implications for the reform of the LCF, and places it within the
wider context of moves towards budgetary control over renewable
energy support costs across Europe.2. Renewable support policy and politics
From a handful of pioneers in the 1970s and 1980s, such as
Denmark, California and Germany, the development of support
policies for the deployment of renewable energy has now spread
globally. At the end of 2015, at least 173 countries had renewable
energy targets, and an estimated 146 countries had supportpolicies at the national or sub-national level, or both (REN21,
2016).
Support policies have come in a range of forms, including both
price-based support such as ﬁxed Feed-In Tariffs (FITs) and pre-
mium Feed-In-Tariffs, which offer a premium over the wholesale
electricity market price, and quantity-based mechanisms such as
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) or auctions, as well as in-
vestment-related policies such as tax incentives and grants (for a
review see Batlle et al., 2012). While all of these approaches have
been used across Europe, ﬁxed FITs or premium FITS were the
most popular through the 1990s and 2000s, although following
pressure from the European Commission, there is now con-
vergence on the use of auctioning. In the US, the RPS has been the
more common form. As described below in more detail, the UK
began with an RPS, but is now phasing out this approach in favour
of a type of FIT which uses auctioning to set the price and requires
the recipient to pay the difference if the market price exceeds the
ﬁxed price. The UK also added a conventional ﬁxed FIT for small
scale renewables in 2010.
The cost of support programmes is most commonly borne by
electricity consumers, either by passing the costs of subsidies
through via suppliers, or via a levy. For example, amongst 23
European Union countries in 2013/14, 12 used levies on bills to
cover these costs, eight allowed the pass-through of costs, and two
used both routes (CEER, 2015).
As experience with renewable electricity support programmes
has grown, it has become clear that policy makers have to balance
a number of aspects of support policy design. One balancing act
involves giving existing and potential investors sufﬁcient certainty
about policy direction to ensure that investment is forthcoming,
while also adapting support mechanisms in the light of new in-
formation, especially about technology costs (Jordan and Matt,
2014).
For FIT approaches, a key challenge has been how to amend
support levels when there is asymmetric information between
private investors and policy makers about true costs of technolo-
gies. It was this problem of asymmetric information that led the
UK to reject the FIT approach in the early 2000s in favour of an RPS
design that was intended to force private actors to reveal true
costs (Mitchell and Connor, 2004), although in practice it has still
been possible for rents to be earned (Ragwitz et al., 2007). A clo-
sely related balancing act is the need to set levels of support suf-
ﬁciently high to ensure investment, while at the same time en-
suring that the resulting costs for consumers and socially and po-
litically acceptable.
In practice, these two dynamics run in tandem, producing
concurrent policy and political challenges. As Stokes (2013) shows
in the example of Ontario, producer coalitions tend to press for
high, stable levels of support, while both cost effectiveness and
political sustainability concerns imply that subsidy levels should
come down over time, but not so rapidly that investment is
choked off. Because this balance is hard to get right, support
programmes for some technologies and in some countries have
been characterised by boom-and-bust cycles, as noted above.
Stokes (2013) concludes that policy needs to be adaptive, with
opportunities for degression of support rates at certain points in
time or deployment milestones. To do this effectively takes con-
siderable effort and resource. For example in Germany, where
degression has been relatively effective but still far from perfect,
policy makers have regulated to make cost information available
and committed resources to analyse this data as the basis for
periodic adjustments.
It is within this context that recent developments in the UK
must be seen. As described in more detail in the next section,
changes introduced in the Electricity Market Reform process from
2010 onwards sought a particular set of solutions to the balancing
Table 1
Levy Control Framework caps
2011/12 to 2020/21. Sources:
DECC (2011, 2013).
dm (2011/12 prices)
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moving from an RPS to a FIT approach, while seeking to overcome
the asymmetric information problem through auctions. Laid on
top of these changes, the Levy Control Framework is a mechanism
for limiting the overall costs of subsidy for consumers.2011/12 1844
2012/13 2352
2013/14 2884
2014/15 3560
2015/16 4300
2016/17 4900
2017/18 5600
2018/19 6450
2019/20 7000
2020/21 76003. The Levy Control Framework
3.1. Renewable electricity support policy in the UK since 2002
Dedicated support for electricity from renewable sources in the
UK started in the early 2000s, with the Renewables Obligation
(RO).2 This was a portfolio standard approach that set a target
quantity of renewable generation, rising steadily over time from
3% of supply in 2002–03 to 20% around 2020 (Woodman and
Mitchell, 2011). The RO was subsequently amended on several
occasions but the basic principle of a quantity target was retained.
In 2008, the RO target was superseded by the binding target
taken on under the EU's 2020 climate and energy package of 15%
of energy to come from renewable sources by 2020, and an ex-
pectation that this meant around 30% of electricity from renew-
able sources. At the time the target was agreed to, renewable
generation was 5% of the total; by 2014 the share had reached 18%
and by the third quarter of 2015 it was 23.5% (DUKES, 2015; DECC,
2016a). The RO was mainly aimed at larger investments but in
2010, after lobbying from environmental organisations and the
Renewable Energy Association, a Feed-in Tariff support mechan-
ism modelled on continental European examples was introduced
for small-scale renewables (under 5 MW).
In 2014, a new support mechanism policy for larger invest-
ments – Contract for Difference Feed-in-Tariffs (CfD FITs) – was
introduced under the Electricity Market Reform process. Owners
of a particular type of renewable electricity technology with a CfD
FIT receive a payment equal to the difference between the
wholesale electricity market price and a ﬁxed price (known as a
‘strike’ price), but if the market price rises above the strike price,
owners have to pay back the difference. In addition, rather than
the government setting the strike price as with small scale FITs,
the strike price is determined through an auction process, where
the government periodically tenders a certain amount of capacity
by a particular technology.
CfD FITs superseded the RO, which is now being phased out.
While CfD FITs currently encompass just renewable electricity,
they are an instrument targeted more generally at ‘low-carbon’
forms of generation, and if new nuclear power plants are built in
the UK these would also be included in the CfD FIT regime. The
government has already negotiated a CfD FIT of d92.5/MW h for
the proposed new nuclear plant at Hinkley C.
Electricity suppliers in the ﬁrst instance are required to meet
the costs of all of these support programmes.3 However, suppliers
are then allowed to pass on the costs involved to consumers.
Following a series of consultations over the early 2010s, the Gov-
ernment excluded energy-intensive consumers from these pass-
through costs on competitiveness grounds in the 2015 Spending
Review. It is also likely that businesses in the non-tradeable sector
will seek to pass through most or all of these policy costs to ﬁnal
consumers as normal business costs. Thus the burden of pass-2 Prior to this, renewable electricity projects could beneﬁt from the Non-Fossil
Fuel Obligation, but this mechanism was mainly designed to support nuclear
power, and while some bids were made to build windfarms with NFFO support, in
practice few were built (Woodman and Mitchell, 2011)
3 Technically, in the CfD Fit the immediate counter-party is a government
backed company, but the costs incurred by that company in setting up CfD’s is then
allocated to suppliers through a formula based on demand they meet.through costs largely falls on households.
3.2. The Levy Control Framework
Up until 2010, there was no ofﬁcial limit on such pass-through
energy policy costs. However, following the general election in
2010, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition govern-
ment introduced a new approach. The Spending Review in the
summer of 2010 set an overall cap on costs passed through to
consumers created through energy policies by the Department of
Energy and Climate Change (DECC), including renewable energy
support policies. This was then formalised in what was called the
Levy Control Framework (LCF) (HM Treasury, 2011). The LCF sets a
cap on some policy costs every year, with the cap being set for a
number of years ahead being set in Spending Reviews. Renewable
electricity policy costs are included under the LCF but not the costs
of other policies, such as the Capacity Market, the Warm Home
Discount or the Energy Company Obligation for energy efﬁciency
(HoC ECCC, 2016a). The LCF caps for the renewable electricity
programmes for the ﬁrst two Spending Reviews are shown in
Table 1. There are at the time of writing no caps set for the LCF
after 2020.4
Levy controlled expenditure in any one year can be written as:
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ) ( )∑ ∑ ∑+ ⋅ + − ( )PiQi BjQj Pk R QkP 1i j kROC
The ﬁrst term represents spending associated with the small
scale FIT. Pi are the administratively set tariffs per kWh of gen-
eration for each small scale FIT technology i, and Qi represents
generation from each technology. The second term represents
spending associated with the Renewables Obligation, where PROC
is the average price of Renewables Obligation Certiﬁcates in the
ROC market, Bj are the bandings associated with each RO tech-
nology j, and Qj is the generation from each technology. Note that
the sum of the Qj in each year can be expected to be broadly re-
lated to the RO target for that year, although it will not necessarily
be the same because some suppliers may choose to pay the buy-
out price. Finally, the third term represents spending associated
with the CfD FITs, where Pk are the strike prices for each CfD FIT
technology k (either set administratively through the FiDER pro-
cess or through bidding in auctions in the main CfD FIT process)
and R represents the reference price. Qk is the amount of gen-
eration rewarded under the CfD FIT scheme, which is determined
in turn by the amount of capacity auctioned and average load
factor for each technology k.
The framework then requires DECC to set policies such that the4 The Committee on Climate Change has indicated that it believes that the
envelope should be around d11 billion in the middle of the next decade, falling to
d10 billion by 2030 (CCC, 2013).
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produced by DECC and agreed as necessary by the Treasury and
veriﬁed by the Ofﬁce of Budget Responsibility (OBR), and with the
Treasury having full access to the methodology behind forecasts.
There is a 20% ‘headroom’ allowance for unexpected events, but
overall the framework is designed to keep costs within the central
cap. Where policies are forecast to overspend against the envel-
ope, ‘DECC will have to develop plans to bring spend back within
the cap taking into account impact on energy bills and progress
towards our targets’ (DECC, 2011: 3). If this is not done the un-
derlying threat is that the excess will be taken out of DECC's de-
partmental budget. Moreover, DECC's plans for containing spend-
ing need to be approved by the Treasury (HM Treasury, 2011). The
expectation is that changes that increase spending through one
policy would be offset by a decrease in spend through another
policy.
Up until 2015, the LCF did not attract a lot of attention because
forecast spending appeared to ﬁt comfortably under the cap. In its
Annual Energy Statement in the autumn of 2014, DECC's view was
that it the LCF would allow additional spending looking ahead
rising from around d50 m in 2015/16 to d1bn in 20202/21 (DECC,
2014). However, going into the 2015 general election, this view
was challenged by the think-tank Policy Exchange. In a May 2015
blog post, Richard Howard (2015) argued that DECC was being
over-optimistic and had underestimated future costs of existing
renewables policies within the LCF due to three effects.
These can be seen in terms of the elements in Eq. (1) above. The
ﬁrst was that declining market prices due to gas price falls meant
that Contracts for Difference would be more costly because of the
larger difference between the reference price (R) and strike prices.
The second effect was that DECC had underestimated the scale of
expansion of solar PV (i.e. elements of Qi). The third was that DECC
had underestimated how much electricity offshore wind farms
would actually generate (i.e. the load factor which partly de-
termined Qk), due to technological improvements. Transitional
arrangements for the introduction of CfD FITs had also cut into the
overall budget more than anticipated (Cornwall Energy, 2015).
The overall result, Howard calculated, was that the entire LCF
envelope out to 2020, i.e. reaching d7.6 billion by that date, was
effectively already spent. There would be no room for a further
expansion of renewables going forward. In June, Cornwall Energy
(2015) estimated an overspend of the LCF cap of around d300
million by 2020. Then in July, the OBR released forecasts for the
LCF that reached d9.8 billion in 2020/21 (OBR, 2015), not only well
above the d7.6 billion cap but also slightly above the 20% head-
room provision (Fig. 1).Fig. 1. Projected spending on RO, FiT and CfD against LCF caps. Source: DECC
(2013), OBR (2015).4. The Levy Control Framework and UK renewable energy
policy
The immediate effect of the anticipated overspend on the LCF
envelope was to drive policy change. As required, DECC quickly
responded to the OBR forecasts by making a number of proposals
for changes to support mechanisms.5 The response differed ac-
cording to what variables in the mechanisms that could be directly
inﬂuenced through policy levers:
 For the small-scale FIT programme, this is the tariff levels (Pi in
Eq. (1) above). Cuts in tariff levels would not only reduce
spending directly, but could also be expected to dampen future
investment, thereby lowering generation (Qi in Eq. (1)) in future
years. In the summer of 2015 DECC proposed sharp reductions
in the FIT support rates for solar PV, and these were ultimately
cut by between 64% and 85%.
 For spending under the RO there are fewer direct policy levers.
The ROC price (PROC) is set by demand for Certiﬁcates and
trading amongst utilities, and while the quantity of renewable
generation (Qj) is loosely related to the evolution of the Ob-
ligation targets, these have been set over a long period and
suppliers can in any case pay the buy-out price rather than
sourcing renewable electricity. Banding (Bj) was similarly set
through legislation and would be difﬁcult to change quickly.
Because of these constraints, and because the RO was being
phased out already to allow the phasing in of the CfD FIT, the
approach by DECC was to accelerate the removal of support for
certain technologies. DECC had already announced in April 2015
a phase out of RO support for solar PV by 2017. In July 2015 the
Department announced that it would bring forward this phase
out by a year. The conditions for biomass support under the RO
were also changed. The new Conservative government had al-
ready announced that it was withdrawing support for on-shore
wind through the RO in the form of a manifesto commitment,
but the LCF situation was a powerful reinforcing factor. As in-
dustry analyst Cornwall Energy (2015: 4) put it: “…the closure
of the RO and (probably) CfD to onshore wind cannot purely be
viewed as a NIMBY-istic reaction to the development of big
energy projects in the countryside; it should also be seen from
the point of view of increasing consumer levies under a
politically agreed cap on spending.”
 Control over spending in the CfD FIT can be achieved through
the auctioning process. As noted above, auctioning is often
presented as a good solution to problems of asymmetric in-
formation, but in the context of budgetary control auctions are
also attractive because they allow control over the pace and
extent of expansion of support to renewables. The RO set a
pathway for expansion, but this was set a long way into the
future, whereas auctions give much greater ﬁne tuning, since
government decides when auctions are held and for what vo-
lume of capacity (helping to determine Qk in Eq. (1) above).
Following the publication of the revised OBR projections of LCF
spend in July 2015, there was no information on further auction
rounds for offshore wind under the CfD FIT until mid-Novem-
ber, when the Secretary of State announced that there would be
further rounds, conditional on whether cost assumptions are
realised. The 2016 Budget subsequently announced that d730
million would be available to 2020, with d290 million available
for the next round in 2016.5 See the written Ministerial Statement by Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth on 22
July 2015, Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/levy-control-fra
mework-cost-controls
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niﬁcant shift in the nature of renewable electricity support policy
in the UK. Through the 2000s, the main approach (i.e. the RO) was
essentially a quantity-based measure, but one that provided a
steady projected increase in renewable generation into the future.
In 2010 the Feed-in Tariff was introduced as a complementary
policy for small scale renewables, which was essentially a price-
based mechanism with an open-ended approach to quantity. Since
2014 the RO has been superseded by the CfD FIT, which is a price-
based measure with indirect control over quantity via the setting
of auctions. The LCF however, has brought all of these mechanisms
under a budgetary-based approach.
It is important to grasp how far the LCF brings renewable en-
ergy policy within the scope of budgetary policy.6 The LCF is based
on “a strong presumption that agreement would not be given
outside of a Spending Review process for changes [in renewable
electricity support policies] that take central projections above the
agreed cap- including for additions of new policies to the frame-
work” (HM Treasury, 2011: 4). This implies that it is Spending
Reviews, rather than, say, carbon budgets, which are the primary
framework for setting the direction and extent of renewables
policy. Renewable electricity support policies are also subject to
any changes in the Treasury's budgeting framework (ibid). This
relocation of energy policy under budgetary policy is symbolised
by the supervisory role that the Treasury now plays, effectively
overseeing the evolution of renewable energy policy.7 An em-
phasis on budgetary control over policy impact was noted by the
National Audit Ofﬁce in 2013, which found that the levy control
board (the joint DECC and Treasury governing body for the LCF)
“examines how deployment of renewable technologies affects
costs charged to the Framework but it has not tracked the re-
sulting progress towards decarbonisation.” (NAO, 2013: 20).
These considerations raise the possibility that the realisation of
renewable energy targets might be prevented through the im-
position of budgetary targets. So far, this does not appear to be the
case. While the formal EU target is for renewable energy rather
than electricity, the UK's National Renewable Energy Action Plan
does have an expectation that 30% of electricity will come from
renewable sources by 2020.8 In 2015 the share of renewables was
24.7%, and with further capacity growth factored in to the LCF it
seems likely that this electricity target will be met. Late last year
the Committee on Climate Change also calculated that even with
the changes to support in 2015, the expansion of renewable under
the LCF to 2020 is compatible with the rate of expansion that the
Committee consider necessary to meet carbon budgets.9 However,
because of the uncertainty built in to LCF expenditure as described
in Section 2 above, because caps for LCF spending beyond 2020
have not yet been determined, and because there is a political
element to the setting of the LCF cap as discussed further below, it
is still possible, at least in principle, for the two sets of objectives
not to be consistent.6 Some accounts (see for example Benson and Russell, 2014) do not appear to
have taken on board that LCF elements, which are now far larger than any low-
carbon spending directly out of tax, now form part of the budget.
7 A widely held view is that energy policy under the current government is
effectively made by the Chancellor George Osborne rather than the Energy Secre-
tary Amber Rudd; see for example: http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/
2015/10/dennis-clark-rudds-energy-policy-failure-and-how-shemust-turn-it-
around.html
8 In late June 2016, a referendum on EU membership was held and was won by
a majority favouring that the UK should leave the EU. The length of time that this
process will take is uncertain at the time of writing. At the earliest this could be in
2018, but could be after 2020. It is also uncertain whether the UK will retain 2020
targets for renewable energy, and what these will be.
9 https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/technical-note-budget-management-
and-funding-for-low-carbon-electricity-generation/5. Protecting consumers and underpinning investor
conﬁdence
It is clear that the Levy Control Framework sets a cap on
spending for renewable electricity support. However, it is not
entirely clear what the purpose of the framework is. That some
confusion exists can be seen in some of the evidence given to the
Energy and Climate Change Committee enquiry on investor con-
ﬁdence, with one investment manager stating that: “I think it
would help if it was clear what the LCF stands for. What is it trying
to achieve? How does it ﬁt within the overall framework of
reaching the 2020 goals? ”.10
One technical reason put forward for the introduction of the
LCF is the reclassiﬁcation by the Ofﬁce of National Statistics at the
end of the 2000s of the costs of renewable support on bills as a tax,
and the payments given to generators as public expenditure
(DECC, 2011).11 This reclassiﬁcation was apparently made on the
grounds that the costs of renewable electricity support are levied
in such a way that they assessment is based in turn on the ap-
proach taken in the European System of Accounts, which was
updated in 2010. However, this argument cannot per se account
for budgetary control, which is the key element of the LCF.
Another argument, put forward by some in government at the
time of the introduction of the LCF,12 is that it was becoming clear
that the sums involved were going to become signiﬁcant towards
2020, and have a potential macroeconomic effect. Costs therefore
needed to be brought under the ambit of budgetary planning.
However, since the amount raised for support to renewables under
the LCF is spent immediately, this is in effect a hypothecated tax
which will have distributional effects but no major macro-
economic effect. This point also applies to the idea that the LCF is
somehow related to the austerity policies of the coalition and
subsequent Conservative governments. The cost pass-throughs
covered by the LCF may be counted as tax, and payments to
owners of renewables as public spending, but since they largely
cancel each other out they are revenue neutral, and reducing or
limiting the total LCF envelope will have no mitigating effect on
the government deﬁcit or public debt (DECC, 2011).
A more relevant and convincing reason found in ofﬁcial doc-
umentation is about impacts of policy on consumers. The LCF is
framed as ensuring that energy policy is ‘consistent with economic
recovery and minimising the impact on consumer bills.’ (HM
Treasury, 2011: 3), and averting the possibility that ‘spending [on
policies] on an ongoing basis could lead to an unsustainable in-
crease in electricity bills’ (DECC, 2011: 4). However, even within
this account there are two potentially distinct rationales. One is
that the purpose of the LCF cap is aimed at protecting the welfare
of consumers. The other is, in the words of the Energy and Climate
Change Committee (HoC ECCC, 2016a: 23–24), that “it provides an
assurance that costs to consumers will be kept under control,
which is important because uncontrolled costs can undermine
public support for policy measures” which in turn is essential for
overall investor conﬁdence.
5.1. Effects on consumers
We ﬁrst consider the role of protecting consumers. Since heavy10 Lilia Stoyanova, Director at the Townsend Group, investment managers for
the Environment Agency Pension Fund, ECCC (2016b).
11 At the point that the LCF was introduced, the ONS had ruled on the RO but
was still considering whether the small scale FiT should be similarly classiﬁed.
However, on the basis that the RO decision made it very likely that the ONS would
reach a similar conclusion on the FiT, the government moved to include the FiT
within the LCF as well.
12 Personal communication, political advisor in DECC, 29 February 2016.
13 In October 2012 a source in the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce was quoted as saying:
"This is very big. Energy prices is one of the biggest issues on the doorstep and we
are determined to do something" (Wintour and Carrington; 2012). As prices peaked
in 2008, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown intervened, convening a summit
with energy companies to broker rebates for those most affected. Prices remained
high as the coalition government came into ofﬁce. In the autumn of 2013, energy
costs rose to the top of the political agenda again following a speech by the then
Leader of the Opposition, Ed Miliband. At this point the Conservative Primate
Minister, David Cameron, announced that tariff rules would be changed to avoid
overcharging by utilities.
14 http://www.bsa-data.natcen.ac.uk/
15 http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/our_history
16 Vallely (2008) cites Conservative Party spokesman Peter Ainsworth arguing
that the disguising of stealth taxes as green taxes has so “poisoned the well of
public goodwill that I’m beginning to wonder whether green taxes will ever be
possible”.
17 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/solar-photovoltaics-deployment
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businesses can be expected to pass through policy costs ultimately
to households, ‘consumers’ here means the domestic sector.
The LCF has been criticised for not reﬂecting accurately the
likely evolution of the burden of policy costs on consumers. First,
the spending envelope includes only policy costs relating to re-
newables, and not the costs of other policies, notably the Capacity
Market, (a security of supply mechanism set up under the Elec-
tricity Market Reform that pays owners of generation capacity and
those offering demand side reduction to be available for speciﬁc
periods). According to HoC ECCC (2016a) the government will in-
clude Capacity Market spending within a more widely deﬁned LCF,
but not within the cap as currently set. The National Audit Ofﬁce
(NAO 2013: 28) argues that “including some consumer-funded
electricity market support schemes but not others…risks under-
mining the utility of the Framework as a mechanism for con-
sidering the affordability and relative merits of spending on dif-
ferent interventions.”
In addition, only the direct costs of renewable support policy
are included in the LCF, rather than the net costs reﬂecting full
system and market effects (HoC ECCC, 2016a). For example, when
the wholesale electricity market price falls, this lowers the re-
ference price (R in Eq. (1) above), and increases spending under
the LCF because the gap between the strike price and the reference
price increases. However, in a competitive market, lower whole-
sale prices should feed through to lower retail prices, so that the
overall increase in costs to the consumer should be much lower (in
a perfectly competitive market there would be no increase). Sec-
ondly, the merit order effect of higher renewable electricity gen-
eration should also suppress wholesale prices. According to evi-
dence given to the Energy and Climate Change Committee enquiry
on investor conﬁdence, for every d1 spent on subsidising offshore
wind, there is a 60p reduction in wholesale prices via this effect
(HoC ECCC 2016b, Q203). Against these two effects, a higher pro-
portion of variable renewable generation has implications in terms
of balancing costs.
Overall then, it can be argued that the LCF does not currently
function well as a mechanism for protecting consumer welfare by
limiting electricity policy costs, because it does not accurately
capture the net effects of all relevant costs.
At the same time, there are reasons to doubt that the primary
function of the LCF is to protect the poorest and most vulnerable
domestic energy consumers. A commonly made point about policy
costs passed through to energy consumers is that the distribu-
tional effects are particularly regressive, representing a greater
proportional burden on the poorest households and the ‘fuel poor’
(e.g. Ekins and Lockwood, 2011; Chawla and Pollitt 2013; Thumin
et al., 2014). This is partly because of limits to the income elasticity
of demand for energy, but it is also because poorer households
tend to pay more on average for each unit of energy as they are
more likely to be on pre-payment meters or on standard variable
tariffs (Preston et al., 2010). Some households in these lower
deciles will beneﬁt from offsetting income supplements and en-
ergy efﬁciency measures, but the targeting of these is poor
(Chawla and Pollitt, 2013). In this context, the LCF might be seen as
an attempt to protect such consumers. However, this argument is
undermined by the fact that wider government policy has had, if
anything, the opposite effect on the poorest households. Wider tax
and spending policies since 2010 aimed at reducing the govern-
ment deﬁcit have hit these households the hardest, reducing net
incomes most in the bottom three deciles (Browne, 2010; Browne
and Elming, 2015; Hood, 2015;). Within this wider context,
therefore, it is difﬁcult to interpret the LCF as being primarily
about protecting the welfare of the poorest households.5.2. Effects on investor conﬁdence
A second potential rationale for the LCF is that it will underpin
investor conﬁdence in renewable energy policy by limiting costs,
not so much for the poorest households but for the public in
general, thereby maintaining public support for policy. The wider
context for ﬁnancing support to renewable energy through cost
pass-through to consumers since the late 2000s has been parti-
cularly challenging. Underlying energy costs rose through the
2000s, while real wages in the lower and middle part of the labour
market were stagnant, and have fallen since the ﬁnancial crisis in
2008 (Gregg et al., 2014; Goos and Manning, 2007). With the re-
sulting squeeze on living standards in which energy costs played a
signiﬁcant role, the political salience of energy rose sharply.13
Over the same period, attitudes to taxes have hardened; the
proportion of respondents supporting an increase in tax and
spending fell from a level of around 60% in the early 1990s to
around 30% by 2010, with the decline accelerating from the start of
the 2000s.14 This period also saw the setting up of the Taxpayers
Alliance, an anti-tax lobby group with considerable inﬂuence and
reach through the media.15 Environmental policy costs on energy
bills received an increasing amount of attention, being progres-
sively relabelled by the end of the 2000s as ‘green stealth taxes’,16
especially in parts of the print media (e.g. Derbyshire 2008a,
2008b; Henderson, 2009; Moore, 2009; Shaw 2010; Ingham, 2010;
Mortished and Whitwell, 2010; Leach and Gray, 2010; Wardrop,
2011; Macrae, 2011; Poulter, 2011). While renewable energy re-
mains broadly popular (DECC, 2009; DECC, 2016b), there is limited
willingness to pay for it – in a 2010 survey, for example, Spence
et al. (2010) found 36% of respondents unwilling to pay anything
more for renewable electricity, and 88% unwilling to pay more
than d10 a month.
At the same time, the distribution of the ﬁnancial beneﬁts from
renewable electricity policy has been quite concentrated. The vast
majority of wind power assets in the UK are owned by the six large
energy utility companies and other large and medium sized wind
companies. The remainder are owned almost all by landowners.
The distribution of ownership of solar PV is more complex, with
about half of assets now in the form of larger installations owned
by companies and half owned by households as roof-top
installations.17 How ownership of roof-top solar is distributed is
not known, but it is likely to be concentrated amongst better-off
households (Grover, 2013). Only a very small proportion of re-
newable energy assets 60 MW in 2014, representing around
0.3% of the total (DECC, 2014b) – are community owned. The
concentration of the beneﬁts of renewable energy support policies
in the hands of corporations, especially the six large utilities, is
also difﬁcult politically, since these companies are generally
unpopular.
In such a context the underlying fear, expressed for example by
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…signiﬁcantly in coming years would lead to a high risk of a more
sustained public backlash, which might be stoked and ampliﬁed
by inﬂuential critics of climate policy in parliament and in the
media. This could cause an unravelling of the entire policy fra-
mework that underpins the low-carbon transition in this country.”
These fears are partly based on experiences in other countries
across Europe, most of which have the same approach to ﬁnancing
the policy costs of renewable electricity support as the UK, i.e.
from cost pass-throughs or levies on bills (CEER, 2015). As noted
above, several of these countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Greece, Italy and Spain) have made retrospective or
retroactive cuts in support rates and introduced moratoria on new
investments, mostly triggered by surges in cost (Keep on Track; del
Río and Mir-Artigues, 2012, 2014; Fouquet and Nysten, 2015;
Gatzert and Kosub 2016). These policy changes have had major
negative effects on investor sentiment, and in some cases have led
to legal action (Behn and Fauchald, 2015).
Seen in this light, the events of 2015 show both the strength
and the weakness of the LCF as a mechanism for underpinning
investor conﬁdence. By taking a forward look at likely expenditure
and signalling limits to that expenditure, the Framework arguably
prevented a situation emerging later where the UK government
would have to take retrospective actions, which are particularly
damaging to investor conﬁdence (HoC ECCC, 2016b Q230). How-
ever, partly because of the sudden changes in mid-2015 triggered
under the LCF framework, and the uncertainty it has created about
the future, there has still been a negative impact on investor
sentiment. In July 2015, the UK lost its position in the top ten of
the Ernst and Young Renewable Attractiveness Index, which it has
held since the Index was started in 2005. A survey of the Low
Carbon Finance Group network of senior energy ﬁnanciers in
August and September of 2015 found that while the UK is viewed
as an attractive country with low sovereign risk, the announce-
ments and proposals made in mid-2015 produced a ‘serious ero-
sion of conﬁdence in the …renewable energy market’ (Hamilton,
2015: 1). Survey respondents reported that investment and credit
committees18 in the UK were nervous about the direction and
stability of policy, and one reported ‘increased uncertainty in the
banking and sponsor community of the impact of ongoing UK
Treasury spending review of the LCF.’ (Hamilton, 2015: 4).
The single biggest short-term concern was the resulting lack of
clarity about future CfD allocation rounds. The introduction of the
CfD FITs was speciﬁcally intended to reduce risk for investors,19 by
providing them with a long-term, ﬁxed price contract for low-
carbon electricity rather than the variable price of a RO certiﬁcate.
In principle, the LCF was also supposed to provide reassurance to
investors by indicating the size of the available pipeline looking
ahead (HoC ECCC, 2016a, 2016b). However, the unintentional ef-
fect of the LCF has been to introduce several new sources of
uncertainty.
One is that, as described in Section 2.2 above the factors that
determine policy costs are variable and uncertain but the LCF caps
are ﬁxed, which means that uncertainty about whether caps will
be breached is built into the design of the Framework. This
variability can be large; as HoC ECCC (2016a, 2016b) points out, the
estimate of spend under the LCF in 2020/21 changed by d3.25
billion between autumn 2014 (in the DECC Annual Statement) and
summer 2015 (the OBR Forecast). Uncertainty about expected
spending arose not only from sources like underlying future18 These bodies in banks and institutional investors are key to approving funds
– see UNEP/SEFI/Bloomberg/Chatham House (2009: 14).
19 See Ed Davey’s comments at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20121217150421/http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/pn12_0146/pn12_
0146.aspxelectricity prices but also from political decisions, such as whether
or not biomass co-ﬁring in the large thermal Drax plant would
obtain State Aid approval from the European Commission, and
therefore whether allowance for this needs to be included in the
LCF spend (Cornwall Energy, 2015). There is likewise uncertainty
about whether the large tidal lagoon project at Swansea Bay will
be included or not. Another source of uncertainty arises from the
fact that resources for support under the CfD FITs in the LCF are
further divided into ‘technology pots’. Allocations between these
pots can and has changed, and investors do not have certainty
about whether this may happen again in the future. Since support
costs per MWh differ by technology, a reallocation of support
between pots within the overall LCF budgetary cap would have
implications for the available capacity to bid for under the differ-
ent pots. Finally, there is currently no certainty about the LCF
envelope after 2020, which is affecting the long term investment
climate (Deben, 2015; Hamilton 2015, HoC ECCCa 2016a, 2016b;
Johnston, 2016). The period after 2020 is also complicated by
uncertainty about whether or not a new nuclear plant will be built
and operational within the next LCF period (2021–27), since sup-
port to nuclear would be a large item.
Some of these uncertainties arise from factors that investors
and other market actors already face. However, because the as-
sumptions and methodology used by DECC in calculating LCF
spending projections have not been made public, these actors
cannot make their own assessments of the risks involved. Indeed
some industry actors believe that part of the variability in esti-
mates of 2020/21 spending over the course of 2015 was due to
changes about assumptions made in the calculation of LCF
spending (HoC ECCC, 2016a: 28). This lack of transparency has
been widely criticised (ibid).206. Conclusion and policy implications
The Levy Control Framework is a new and signiﬁcant devel-
opment in renewable support policy in the UK, with potentially
wide ramiﬁcations. In this paper I have argued that the LCF has
already had important effects on renewable energy support policy,
accounting for much of the unexpected policy change in 2015.
Various sources of uncertainty are built into the calculation of
future costs under the LCF, which combines with a ﬁxed cap cre-
ates permanent uncertainty about whether future caps will be
breached.
The wider signiﬁcance of the LCF is that it places a budgetary
mechanism on top of existing price-based and quantity-based
mechanisms for renewable electricity support. It relocates support
to renewable energy from the spheres of energy and the en-
vironment to the sphere of budgetary control, and brings the
politics of cost to bear more explicitly on renewable energy policy.
It also implies a shift of the locus of policy control from the De-
partment of Energy and Climate Change to the Treasury. Thus far
the imposition of budgetary control does not imply that renewable
electricity targets will not be met, but the development of the LCF
nevertheless raises this possibility in future.
The purpose of the LCF is not wholly clear. It is not clear that
the LCF can best be interpreted as part of efforts by governments
since 2010 to protect consumers from policy costs, especially the
poorest households. If the LCF is aimed at this purpose, it is not
well-designed, since it does not include all policy costs and does
not reﬂect full system costs for consumers. Even if protecting the
welfare of consumers is not the primary purpose of the LCF it20 http://www.carbonbrief.org/levy-control-framework-unanswered-
questions
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The LCF is most readily understood as a measure to prevent the
undermining of public support for renewables policy by contain-
ing costs, and thereby shoring up investor conﬁdence. As Stokes
(2013: 496) observes, “Enacting and implementing an ambitious
renewable energy policy is a politically difﬁcult task”, and in a
wider context of squeezed incomes over a large part of the po-
pulation and a political environment hostile to tax, the task is even
more difﬁcult. In this sense, the LCF can be seen as an attempt to
provide a solution to managing potential tensions between goals
for expanding renewable energy (seen in the 2020 and 2030
European climate and energy packages) on the one hand and the
costs to energy consumers on the other (HoC ECCC, 2016a, 2016b).
It can also be seen as a measure to avoid what has happened in
some other European countries where investment booms, espe-
cially in solar PV, have led to retrospective and retroactive policy
reversals and moratoria.
The experience of 2015 suggests that while the LCF has so far
avoided the worst of these effects, the policy changes it has trig-
gered have nevertheless undermined investor conﬁdence in the
UK, which has been high to date, somewhat. Investors have also
been frustrated by their inability to develop their own analysis of
the uncertainties built into the LCF because of the government's
lack of transparency on assumptions and methodology for the
calculation of forecasts. Improving the transparency of the calcu-
lation of LCF projections would therefore help the effectiveness of
the Framework as a tool for underpinning investor conﬁdence in
the renewable electricity sector.
However, even reformed in this way, a measure that places a
limit on pass-through costs to households alone is unlikely to be a
satisfactory means by itself to create a truly politically stable basis
for the expansion of renewables. Clear, long-term frameworks of
the type required to produce particularly strong investor con-
ﬁdence and a low risk premium, as in Germany (HoC ECCC, 2016b
Q278) or Denmark usually require the kind of genuine cross-party
commitment that can most easily be built in political systems with
proportional representation (Schaffer and Bernauer, 2014), equi-
table income distributions, political support from strong supply
chain industries built through active industrial and innovation
policy, and arguably a wider distribution of policy rents (Lock-
wood, 2015).
An interesting question is whether the LCF will be adopted in
other European countries. The UK is unusual in having brought
renewable energy under budgetary control in such a formal multi-
year framework. In the Netherlands budget caps for the SDE/SDEþ
support systems for renewable electricity are set by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, but only on an an-
nual basis. However, across the EU, even in countries with very
relatively strong political support for renewable energy, such as
Germany, there have been moves away from open-ended support
to frameworks which involve capacity growth corridors with
triggers for automatic reduction of support rates. In several Eur-
opean countries, including Ireland, Portugal, France, Denmark and
the Netherlands have been moving from price-support (FIT)
schemes to auction based schemes, which as discussed above in-
crease the ability of governments to exercise control on rates of
expansion. The European Commission has encouraged this direc-
tion of travel (2013) and under State Aid rules will require auctions
from 2017 onwards.21 It is therefore possible that other European
countries will continue to move in the direction of greater bud-
getary control over renewable energy expansion, of which the
Levy Control Framework is the most comprehensive form to date.21 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/? uri¼CELEX:52014XC0628
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